By Hadas Aron and Emily Holland One notable aspect of the turn to populism in Central and Eastern Europe is a call for a return to “traditional values.” Putin has repeatedly made appeals to the Orthodox Church, often formally including Patriarch Kyrill in significant political events. Even in relatively secular Hungary, Orban has described himself, the Hungarian nation and Europe as a whole, as a Christian society and has integrated this definition into Hungary’s new constitution. This supposed return to religion in famously atheistic post-Soviet sphere is troubling in several aspects .
In some places this implies a rejection of LGBT rights in the name of tradition, and has led to violence against members of the LGBT community. The turn towards “tradition” also leads to the allocation of resources to churches at the expense of the more egalitarian state welfare system. One understudied aspect of the traditional trend is the role assigned to women in these societies. In some respects, the role of women in Soviet society was relatively egalitarian. Women were a part of the workforce in large numbers and were an active participant of social and political life. On the other hand, Soviet women were encouraged to embrace their sacred role as mothers above all else and never rose to high ranks of leadership. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the promise of liberalism entailed gender equality. Though this is rarely the case in Western society, the ideal for women is equal participation in public life, equal pay and family friendly policies. This never materialized for women in the post-Soviet sphere. The rates of women in parliament in post-Soviet countries is amongst the lowest in the world. Many these countries have generous policies aimed at women, but the outcomes of these policies are often suboptimal. Hungary has three-year paid maternity leave, but a consequence of this policy is that women leave the workforce and find it difficult if not impossible to return. The surge of populism in the region retards women’s rights even further. Leaders who wish to contrast their societies with Western liberal regimes appeal to “traditional” roles of women as part of a general view of masculinity. They are strong leaders whose countries are strong in the face of liberal weakness. In contrast, women are the tender soul of the nation. In an unbelievable speech marking International Women’s Day, Putin addressed the women of Russia (the whole thing is a great read, but here is a particularly nice excerpt). “Dear women, you possess a mysterious power: you keep up with everything, juggle a myriad of tasks, and yet remain tender, unforgettable and full of charm. You bring goodness and beauty, hope and light into this world…I want to say particular words of gratitude today to the women of the wartime generation. Your strength of spirit and your feats taught us to be real men and reach victory in spite of all the obstacles.” In Hungary, Laszio Kover, speaker of parliament, said in Congress “we would like it if our daughters considered it the highest degree of self-fulfillment to give birth to grandchildren.” Worse, these appeals are not just lip service: they are being translated into actual legislation. A recent amendment to Hungary’s Fundamental Law of 2011 was condemned by the United Nations as disguising “gender discrimination under an ideology of conservative family values.” Among one of the more extreme amendments was the protection of the life of a fetus from the moment of conception. Populists use tradition as a mobilizing discourse: part of the discourse assigns women to traditional roles. As evidenced by Hungary, this discourse can have a profound affect on the lives on the lives of women. As this is an integral part of the populist program, Western European and American women are not immune. Donald Trump’s misogynistic outbursts should not be written off as idiosyncratic. Instead, they are a part of his broader strategy that appeals to a traditional type of masculinity not unlike Putin, Orban or other nationalist populist leaders. Women should carefully consider how their vote might affect their lives, their job prospects, and control over their bodies. Men should consider this too.
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By Emily Holland and Hadas Aron We recently came across a great read in the Guardian on authoritarian tendencies in the United States in the Age of Trump. According to Jonathan Freedland, many Americans would prefer “a strong leader who doesn’t have to bother with Congress or elections.” In the current atmosphere of global uncertainty and economic instability it is perhaps unsurprising that a leader like Trump is capitalizing on fear. Many leaders have used these periods in history to establish non-democratic regimes or curtail democratic or liberal rights. The most prominent example of our times is of course, Vladimir Putin, who came to power during a period of democratic instability in Russia and built his “vertical of power” around myths of victimization, a promise of return to former glory, national chauvinism and the vilification of political enemies, both internal and external. If this sounds familiar to you, it is because Trump is taking a page from Putin’s illiberal regimes leader manual. We discuss this very manual in an academic paper that you can read at your leisure here.
However, there are of course striking differences between the United States and Russia. In 2000, Russia’s shaky experience with democracy was less than a decade old, resulted in utter economic collapse, frail institutions and was linked to the fall of empire and national humiliation. At that period, Putin not only had great material to work with, but also a population that had little experience with democracy and was already fed up with its outcomes such as a sharp decline in the standard of living and extremely uneven distribution of wealth. The survey mentioned in the Guardian supposedly locates the same sentiment in Americans, Freedland argues that this means that “one in three US voters would prefer a dictator to democracy.” While the World Values Survey results are troubling, we doubt this is the case. Americans are used to their freedoms, they have experienced the longest run of democracy in modern history and have fully assimilated democratic and liberal values. Of course in any democracy there are hidden non-democratic values: consider the debate over Guantanamo and torture for combatting terrorism. The implication of this debate is that some view juridical processes as contradictory to national security. German political theorist Carl Schmitt noted back in 1921 that democracy is practically eliminated in a state of emergency where liberal rights are suspended in the name of national security. Putin used this strategy early in his tenure with Chechnya and terrorist attacks in Moscow and in fact continues to create ongoing states of emergency to preserve his rule. On the other hand, our experience with 9/11 shows that the United States cannot live in this state for very long. There is an ongoing public debate on the trade-off between liberalism and national security, and the mere existence of this debate is a testament to the strength of U.S. democracy. There is still cause for concern over Donald Trump’s success. Democratic decline has a positive feedback mechanism: when it becomes unpatriotic to raise certain concerns, liberal rights can be curtailed more easily. When liberal rights are curtailed, so is public debate. Brexit has shown us that Trump could win, as populism won in a place with a very long liberal tradition. This victory could either encourage Trump to continue on his path, or it could serve as an alarm bell for American voters. Given the current political climate, it is difficult to tell in which direction the election will go. Nate Silver relies on statistics and thus has no such qualms. By Hadas Aron & Emily Holland The shocking decision by British citizens to leave the European Union is the latest example of events in Europe that raise comparisons to the tragic interwar period. Indeed, the combination of the 2008 financial crisis and the surge of migration from conflict areas has ushered in surge of far right populism, polarization, economic protectionism and xenophobia. But while it seems we are entering a period of deep civilizational strife, are we really doomed to repeat history? Here are a few points of comparison and contrast between the dark interwar years and our own gloomy epoch.
Despite Brexit, it is clear that there are some major differences between the interwar period and the current troubling atmosphere. However, like the interwar period, we are faced with the challenges of xenophobia, populism, nationalism and the prevailing atmosphere of fear. How we respond to them will be the crucial test that puts the West on a path to recovery or collapse. By Hadas Aron and Emily Holland Life for women in ISIS controlled areas of Syria and Iraq is notoriously oppressive. We are inundated with media reports of women being captured and sold as sex slaves, corporal punishment for violations of morality codes, forced marriages and worse. The number and intensity of women-repressive regimes has been growing in recent years. Saudi Arabia is a familiar case, but since the Iranian Revolution and even more so the rise of the Taliban, the global Jihadi movement and its latest representative ISIS, women have been the direct target of repressive regimes. This is puzzling because some of these societies were previously relatively egalitarian and social norms are considered sticky and persistent. This may seem like a new phenomenon, however the targeting of a group in society is not new in repressive regimes. Many regimes in the past such as Serbia in the 1990s or even Nazi Germany directed mass-mobilization against minority groups in order to strengthen their regimes and avoid political unrest. In these societies previously assimilated communities were shattered within the span of a few short years. Looking more closely women-oppressive regimes shows that the repression of women goes hand in hand with other changes: mainly the mass mobilization of society without a reciprocal rise in formal political participation. In all of these cases, there was some kind of popular mobilization: the Syrian civil war, the Iranian Revolution, the rise of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey. However, the demands of the people were not met with formal steps towards democratization. To pacify society, leaders chose targeting women as a strategy that allowed mass-participation in a state project without threatening the regime. Under the Ba’ath party Syria was relatively egalitarian: women served in the military, participated in the workforce, were educated alongside men and were present in the public sphere. In the span of only a few years, life for women under the ISIS regime has dramatically altered: women are no longer seen in the public sphere and do not participate in public life. Even to simply leave their homes, women must be completely covered and accompanied by a male family member. Though far less extreme, Turkey is undergoing a similar transformation. Despite having previously egalitarian policies toward women (women hold 47% of academic positions, makeup 33% of the countries core of engineers), Erdogan’s party has channeled domestic popular unrest by turning against the Kurdish minority and women. In recent years Turkish politics has been characterized by discriminatory expressions and anti-women policies. Then PM, Erdogan publically stated that ‘women are not equal to men’ and that equality is against nature. Deputy PM Bulent Arinc announced that women must be chaste and should refrain from laughing in public. These statements accompanied moves such as transforming the Ministry for Women and Family into the Ministry of Family and Social Policies and re-naming the parliamentary commission on Gender Equality into the Equal Opportunities Commission. Accompanying these state policies has been a disturbing rise in domestic violence incidents and murders of women. Though all of these examples come from Islamic societies, it would be wrong to assume that Islam is the cause for the repression of women. As noted above, in these societies, women were previously integrated into social and professional life to a far greater extent. Some traditional elements exist upon which leaders can capitalize, but like every religion Islam can have a variety of political interpretations and can in fact be compatible with different types of political and social arrangements. The rise of women repressive regimes, in particular under ISIS and the Taliban, is similar to pre-WWII in Germany. Prior to the rise of the Nazi regime, German Jews were completely assimilated into German society. They were highly educated, participated in civil society, held high positions in the state administration and were not segregated geographically or institutionally. Within the span of a few short years, Jews had not only lost their ability to participate in formal state institutions but had become outcasts in society. Some would argue that anti-Semitism was an ever-present factor in Germany society and rest of Europe but in fact as Hannah Arendt argues, the very logic of the totalitarian system was based on the targeting of Jews. Fascist regimes themselves are a direct product of the emergence of mass-society. Social science research on political development claims that when old conservative structures could no longer handle the demands of the masses or adjust their strategies, new types of parties emerged to respond to the new needs. Since these parties were built on popular mobilization but were non-democratic they had to channel the desire to participate in other direction. Using the underlying anti-Semitic sentiment, the Nazi regime allowed the masses to participate in public life by repressing Jews. This was a task that any member of society (except the Jews) could be a part of while simultaneously creating a sense of solidarity and relieving demands on the state. A similar process occurred in former Yugoslavia where Serbian elites channeled the mass mobilization that followed the collapse of the communist regime towards the Croats. Like Ba’ath Syria or Weimar Germany, the two populations were highly integrated and yet within a very short period of time neighbors turned against each other and violence erupted. In all three cases, turning against an internal population was a way channel mass mobilization without democratization. Similarly, women repressive regimes can be explained by internal variant of the rally-around-the-flag effect where leaders consolidate their rule around nationalist chauvinist sentiment. We acknowledge that the egalitarian nature of previous regimes in the Middle East was the result of forced secular authoritarian governmental policies. There is no reason to feel nostalgic for these regimes, however, the current situation for women has been rapidly deteriorating and we should understand that the causes for this are the very logic of the new regimes themselves. If policies against women are considered a part of the political strategy of non-democratic regimes rather than as unfortunate outcome of conservative societies, then leaders should take seriously the condition of women when designing foreign policy. By Hadas Aron and Emily Holland Images of thousands of migrants, making their way across Europe with only the clothes on their backs, are reminiscent of the darkest historical periods in recent memory. The migrant crisis, which has reached biblical proportions, is threatening to unravel the European Union’s passport free Schengen Zone and is causing a deep rift between EU member states. But while migrants fleeing war stricken Middle East, Afghanistan, and Africa are flooding the European Union’s entry points, some political actors are capitalizing on the migrant issue for domestic political gain. Nationalism literature in political science can shed light on why some states have responded with such violent anti-immigrant policies. Germany, who expects to receive almost 800,000 refugee applications this year, is calling on other EU member states to take their share. Leaders in Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, Bulgaria and others are against a quota system, arguing that migrants are a strain on their societies and economies. The same literature that helped explain the violent conflict in the Balkans in the 1990s can increase our understanding of the current crisis. VP Gagnon Jr. demonstrates how Serbian elites framed politics around ethnic cleavages in order to create a domestic political context where ethnic identity is the only topic on the agenda. Therefore, the conflict was not the result of security concerns, but rather of political manipulation. We argue in a recent article that leaders can use certain nationalist policies to define their regimes as protectors of the nation and marginalize liberal oppositions in the process. The current policies put forth in several European states are not intended as real solutions to the migrant problem; instead, they are indicative of domestic political struggles. Hungary, the Southern entry point into Europe’s Schengen zone by land, is completing the controversial construction of a spiked fence on its southern border with Serbia to prevent the entry of migrants, Bulgaria has followed suit, and Estonia recently announced its decision to build a fence to keep out Russian migrants. Even if keeping out the migrants was a reasonable solution, a fence alone could hardly keep out migrants who have traveled thousands of miles facing nearly insurmountable difficulties, unless it was heavily guarded. Second, Hungary and Bulgaria are not actually facing the worst of the migrant problem. The majority of the migrants only wish to pass through them in search of better opportunities in Austrian, Germany, or Scandinavia. While the influx of migrants is a bureaucratic challenge for Hungary and Bulgaria, their response is more a signal to domestic audiences than a rise to the challenge. The Hungarian government is systematically using the migrant issue to detract attention from growing unrest with government policies and corruption, first with an extensive campaign warning migrants (in Hungarian) not to steal jobs from Hungarians, then with the construction the infamous fence. Recently, Hungary closed its Keleti railway station, keeping migrants stranded in the streets of Budapest with no access to basic facilities. This has made the migrant problem more visible than ever to Hungarians. While the Hungarian government is claiming their actions are meant to protect EU borders, the result of their actions is to exacerbate the sense of domestic crisis. Hungary could have easily provided facilities to the migrants, but instead chooses to keep them in poor conditions to reinforce negative stereotypes. After much international outcry, the Hungarian authorities allowed some of the migrants to pass through to Austria, but not before making the passage as difficult as possible and reiterating their position publically. The Hungarian campaign has a proven successful distraction: at the end of 2014, Hungarians filled the streets of Budapest weekly protesting against Orban’s radical government. Today, migrants are the only issue on the public agenda. The discourse in Hungary is becoming increasingly hostile and violent toward migrants, quickly spreading from politicians to media to the public. Violent incidents have already occurred, and as migrants passing through the country are becoming more visible, unrest is growing. This is exactly what Orban’s government wants: it frames Orban as the defender of the Hungarian nation against invaders seeking to take Hungarian jobs and disrupt society. In Bulgaria, the fence along the Turkish border does little to deter migrants, but it does serve as a symbol of the anti-migrant sentiment sweeping Europe. Right Wing parties argue that jihadists are hiding amongst the refugees waiting to cross the border and that caring for the floods of refugees are an unsustainable strain on the national budget. Exacerbating the problem is that in Bulgaria, the anti-migrant sentiment is not just an issue of the far right. Even moderate political groups are proponents of the fence because they want to demonstrate to the European Union that they can secure their borders, and deserve the right to become a Schengen group state. In some states in Europe liberal voices have responded to the crisis with calls to open the borders. But in others, there has been a startling lack of alternative narrative in the press and the general public. In these states the right wing have managed to appropriate the national discourse for so long that liberals have no legitimate claim to the issue. Kahneman and Renshon argue in their 2009 article that hawkish policies resonate with individuals because they overlap with previously held biases. These tendencies are exacerbated in states that have along history of existential concerns such as the small states of Eastern and Southern Europe. As demonstrated by the Balkan nationalism literature, the response to the migrant crisis raises several concerns. First and most immediately, the only way to offer a solution to the large population of desperate people seeking refuge is a cohesive response from European states. Building fences, stopping trains and other stopgap measures simply forces migrants to turn to smugglers and other dangerous methods of entering the European Union. Second, the migrant crisis underscores domestic political fears and gives credence to the growing far right movement within Europe. As Gagnon shows, these conditions are ripe for intensifying conflicts around the continent, in particular in areas already prone to conflict such as Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Right wing elites mobilize support around xenophobic exclusionary narratives leading to growing animosity and even violence between groups. Recently, Hungary’s Orban announced that Europe has a duty to defend her borders from the migrants, who “represent a radically different culture.” This is exactly the language should alert us to a potential emerging political crisis beyond the scope of the migrants. |